A EUROPEAN PROGRESSIVE LOOK ON YOUTH AND DEMOCRACY

A EUROPEAN PROGRESSIVE LOOK ON YOUTH AND DEMOCRACY

Vittorio Emanuele Agostinelli, Consulta giovanile del Cortile dei Gentili

Key words: Democracy, policies, labor market, economic transition,

employment and youth

Abstract

UNO SGUARDO PROGRESSISTA EUROPEO SU GIOVANI E DEMOCRAZIA

I giovani di oggi sono cresciuti e politicizzati in un’epoca di policrisi, durante la quale “forme di disordine climatico, economico, tecnologico e geopolitico sono cresciute e si sono rafforzate a vicenda a un livello mai visto prima”. Alcuni hanno sperimentato una crescente disuguaglianza di reddito e ricchezza, condizioni di salute più precarie, redditi più bassi e più incerti; costi della vita più elevati, minori possibilità di possedere una casa; ritardo nel creare una famiglia o decidere di non averne una; maggiori responsabilità assistenziali nei confronti di genitori e parenti, nonché dipendenza finanziaria da essi. I sondaggi durante e dopo il Covid-19 hanno segnalato un netto peggioramento della qualità della vita rispetto ad altri gruppi demografici. Con il peggioramento delle prospettive economiche e il conflitto in corso in Ucraina, una percentuale maggiore di giovani intervistati prevede che la propria situazione peggiorerà. In questo articolo viene analizzato un recente studio su giovani e democrazia condotto dalla Fondazione di Studi Progressisti Europei (FEPS).

1. The Foundation for European Progressive Studies1

The Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS) is the think tank of the progressive political family at EU level. Its mission is to develop innovative research, policy advice, training and debates to inspire and inform socialist and social democratic politics and policies across Europe. The Foundation operates as hub for thinking to facilitate the emergence of progressive answers to the challenges that Europe faces today. FEPS works in close partnership with its members and partners, forging connections and boosting coherence among stakeholders from the world of politics, academia and civil society at local, regional, national, European and global levels.

Today FEPS benefits from a solid network of 75 member organizations. Among these, 40 are full members, 30 have observer status and 5 are ex-officio members. In addition to this network of organizations that are active in the promotion of progressive values, FEPS also has an extensive network of partners, including renowned universities, scholars, policymakers and activists. Its ambition is to undertake intellectual reflection for the benefit of the progressive movement, and to promote the founding principles of the EU – freedom, equality, solidarity, democracy, respect of human rights, fundamental freedoms, human dignity, and the rule of law.

From the 2022 Main Achievements on Economy and Finance research and studies FEPS reported2 “For NextGenerationEU and the other EU funds to bring the awaited results, there is a need to pursue consistent implementation and adequate investments while at the same time working towards a new approach to economic policy coordination and especially fiscal rules. Therefore, FEPS looked at the progress monitoring, particularly diverse indicators, which should also influence its new approach towards reforming the Stability and Growth Pact. An alternative fiscal framework is needed to progressively meet the Union’s challenges in the coming years and decades.[…] As part of revising European economic governance rules and frameworks, FEPS contributed to discussions around the creation of a European fiscal capacity, particularly trying to reinforce the conceptual link between the EU Green Deal and the need of a new economic governance framework that overcomes the structural problem with sub-optimal investment. Through a policy study on the macro-development perspective of the euro area imbalances, FEPS also contributed to better understanding the link between external competitiveness, trade and current account imbalances. Unsurprisingly, the research points out that wage growth in countries with fiscal space can benefit the stability of the euro area. Besides the work in research therefore, the role of FEPS has been to provide ideas to improve the health of the Economic and Monetary Union towards progressive policymakers to help the emergence of a real economic alternative to the current system.”

2. NEETs:
   European economic context 3

Young people today have grown up and been politicized in an age of poly-crisis, during which “forms of climate, economic, technological and geopolitical turmoil have grown and reinforced each other to a degree never seen before.” Some have experienced rising income and wealth inequality, poorer health, lower and more precarious incomes; higher costs of living, lower chances of owning a home; delay in starting a family or deciding not to have one; greater caring responsibilities for parents and relatives as well as financial dependence on them. Surveys during and since Covid-19 have reported a marked deterioration in their quality of life compared to other demographic groups. With the worsening economic outlook and ongoing conflict in Ukraine, a larger proportion of young people surveyed expect their situation to worsen.

For the purposes of this report, a young person is defined as between 18 and 29 years of age and experiencing socioeconomic disadvantage if they live in a relatively low household income, grew up in an area of high deprivation, have not attended university (except through specific access programmes targeted at young people from disadvantaged backgrounds, as was the case in Ireland) and if not in education or training, are not in employment or are employed in low income and precarious jobs.

Figure 1 shows that in the EU, poverty affects young adults more than older cohorts, women more than men, and those with lower education levels than those with a university degree. Unemployment is also a critical factor. Young adults aged 18-24 years in the EU are at higher risk of poverty (26.5% in 2022) than any cohort, including <18s, at 24.7%, and over 65s, at 20.2%. Low educational attainment exacerbates this risk, as 34.5% of all 18+ years old in 2022 who had not completed secondary school were at risk of poverty, versus 10.5% of those who had gone on to third level education.

The figure 2 shows levels of severe material and social deprivation for young people aged 15-29 years old in the EU, with all countries in the study except Poland showing an increase between 2019 and 2020. In addition, all the case studies, apart from Poland, show higher rates than the median value in 2020. Material deprivation indicators are used by the European Union and the European Commission to monitor progress in the fight against poverty and social exclusion. Based on the limited information available from EU statistics on income and living conditions, material deprivation is defined as the proportion of people living in households who cannot afford at least three of nine items. Severe material deprivation is defined as not being able to afford four out of the same nine items.

Another indicator considered in the ability of young people to transition into adulthood and live independent lives is the proportion who are still living in their parental home. Ireland had the largest percentage of 25–29-year-olds living at home in 2022, or 68% of the total population. Spain and Poland had similar, slightly lower percentages of 67.2% and 63.5%. Similarly, living in overcrowded housing is another variable indicating that young people are at risk of poverty and material and social deprivation. The proportion of the population aged between 15- and 29-years old living in overcrowded conditions shows that Poland has one of the highest percentages in the EU at 47%. The percentage in Ireland is amongst the lowest, at 4.5%, and in Spain, 11%. Other data, however, shows a more complicated picture regarding comparative levels of deprivation. The severe material deprivation rate among 16–29-year-olds in Ireland was 7.6% in 2020, up from 4.6% in 2019. This was a bigger jump compared to 6.0 to 7.9% in Spain and 4.4% to 5.8% In Poland, the percentage decreased from 2% to 1.9% between 2019 and 2022.

Figure 3 shows the percentage of young people (aged 15-29 years old) in the EU by gender who are neither in employment, education or training (NEET). Experience of NEET can have long-lasting detrimental consequences for a young person, that include a negative effect on their future employment outcomes and earnings; on their physical and mental health, on the likelihood of difficulties maintaining relationships and on drug and substance abuse, involvement in criminal activities and social exclusion. The chance of being NEET is affected by area deprivation, socioeconomic position, parental factors (such as employment, education, or attitudes), growing up in care, prior academic achievement and school experiences. Being NEET therefore occurs disproportionately among those already experiencing other sources of disadvantage.
Ireland has the lowest percentage of NEETs amongst 15-34 years old, or 10.3% in 2022, with Poland’s rate at 11.7% and Spain’s at 13.9%. In general, more young women than men are in this category. For example, according to Eurostat data, in 2021, 16.9% of young women were NEETs versus 10.1% of young men. The example of Poland provides some context to these differences, which may not be universal, but offers insight into the existing variations within the NEET group. Nearly one in four NEETs in Poland are unemployed. The majority are women, most of whom will be taking care of children or relatives. Men become NEETs mostly due to illness, disability or unemployment. Moreover, previous research on the topic suggests that NEETs can be divided into four groups in Poland: those just entering the labour market, those returning to work after a long break, those who have lost their jobs, and those who have voluntarily resigned from their previous jobs.

According to the World Health Organisation, self-perceived health is a robust predictor of morbidity and mortality of several diseases which include cancer, stress, cardiovascular disease, among other chronic health conditions. Low self-perceived health is associated with frequent use of healthcare services. Self- perceived health as very good or good among 16-29 years old in Ireland decreased from 93.8% in 2014, or after the financial crisis, to 90.3% in 2022. In Spain over the same period, this percentage decreased from 94.6% to 92% and in Poland, it decreased from 91.7% to 90.5%. In other words, though income is higher in Ireland and overcrowding rates are significantly lower, these figures do not necessarily mean that Ireland fares better in terms of the number of young people living in severe deprivation or who believe they are in good health.

3. The young perception of politics and democracy4

External economic constraints and the impression that politicians can do nothing to improve young people’s lives in practical terms have provoked disillusionment with political institutions. Whereas high levels of post Second World War economic growth gave political authorities considerable budgetary flexibility, enabling them to make tangible improvements to people’s lives, the decline in economic growth since the crises of the 1970s, combined with the acceleration of economic globalization and adoption of neoliberal principles in economic and social policy, has squeezed this margin for action. Limited responses to public concerns and needs have in turn affected young people’s perceptions of government capacity to instigate positive change.

In his 2013 book Ruling the Void, the late political scientist Peter Mair described how citizens in Europe are “withdrawing and disengaging from the arena of conventional politics.” He noted that fewer and fewer citizens are committed to party politics and even voting in elections. Waning support for the traditionally dominant political parties amongst younger generations corresponds with lack of political participation— whether that be through not voting, joining a political party, becoming a union member or volunteering for an advocacy organization (e.g. Friends of the Earth). The expense of such memberships in the context of economic precarity may well be prohibitive too. The example of dwindling trade union membership is illustrative in this regard, not the least since unions are the political organizations that are fighting economic disadvantage. A 2019 ETUI report on union membership in the EU noted its ageing demographics, pointing to a significant increase in the average age of membership in eight countries between 2006 and 2016, including the case studies of Hungary and Spain. The report also predicts a continued decline, stating, “while union density stood at 23% for 40-44-year-olds in 2004, i.e. for members born in the early 1960s, this density had declined about 3 percentage points eight years later for those born between 1970-1974, while density is predicted to stand at 16% in 2020 for the cohort born in the early 1980s.” As union membership typically occurs when workers are entering the job market or in the early years of their career, this trend should have a long-term impact on union density. The drop in union membership can be understood in terms of increased economic precarity and disinterest in traditional politics.

But it is not only participation: Figure 4 shows a declining interest in politics across different cohorts in Europe. A July 2023 survey from Poland provides an indication of why young people seem less interested in politics and in country-specific context in subsequent sections. The survey shows that 70% of respondents agreed with the statement that they “want to have a calm life without needing to engage in political or social issues” conveying a desire not to engage in politics unless necessary. This suggests that young people in Poland do not perceive politics as delivering any personal and perhaps collective benefit, or at least not enough to warrant supporting mainstream parties or participating at all. Whereas the report’s country analysis reflects this assessment in terms of young people experiencing social disadvantage, the 2023 elections in Poland were a striking example of record numbers of young people coming to the polls to defend democracy as a system. This distinction between favouring democracy as a system versus deep dissatisfaction with its functioning is a key theme present throughout the qualitative part of this study.

Figure 5 shows European Social Survey and World Values Survey data on the percentage of 15–29-year-olds reporting to be not at all interested in politics. Although this data is not very recent, it suggests that disinterest is relatively common across wealthy countries - with one in four young people not at all interested in politics. Just under 40% of people between 15-29 years old in Ireland report to be not at all interested in politics, followed by Poland (at just above the OECD average of 24%) and finally Spain at 20%.

Recent studies also show higher levels of discontent among the young than previous generations at similar life stages, partly due to the growing intergenerational divide in life opportunities, and greater dissatisfaction with democracy – not only in absolute terms, but also relative to older cohorts at comparable stages of life. However, European Social Survey data from 2018 or pre-Covid in Figure 6 shows a relatively small gap between levels of satisfaction with democracy among adults and young people. This suggests that further comparative longitudinal analyses on this topic may be necessary to arrive at more conclusive results.

Do a lack of interest in and dissatisfaction with politics lead to a preference for authoritarianism? In an Open Society Foundation survey in 30 countries, while an overwhelming majority of respondents (86%) wanted to live in a democracy and a majority (average of 62%) preferred it as the form of government, just 57% of 18-35-year-olds thought democracy is preferable to any other form of government, compared to 71% of older respondents.36 Amongst 18-35-year-olds, 42% also believed that army rule was a ‘good way to rule the country’ compared to 33% of 36-55-year-olds and 20% of those aged 56 and above. Similarly, 35% of 18–25-year-olds believed that a good way to rule the country was having ‘leaders who do not bother with parliaments or elections’, compared to 32% of 36–55-year-olds and 26% of over 56-year-olds.37 Other studies also find this worrying inclination for non-democratic forms of governing. In 2022, a centre right UK think tank Onward report found that 26% of 18-34-year-olds believed that democracy is a bad form of government for the UK, and 75% feel that experts would do a better job at governing than the government itself.38 The survey also found that 61% agreed with the statement ‘having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections would be a good way of governing this country’ and 46% agreed that ‘having the army rule would be a good way of governing this country’. Both percentage figures contrasted sharply with those of over 55 years old: 29% and 13% respectively. The conclusion of the study was that young people favoured strongmen and were not necessarily against military rule, and that these trends have become more pronounced over the past few decades.

These are worrying results that must be taken very seriously by all those who want to defend democracy. However, there are nuances within these developments that can help to tease out the problem and show ways in which it can be addressed. EU survey data has revealed a sharp decline in trust in national government amongst 18–34-year-olds since the onset of Covid, also revealing that their trust in government is significantly lower than their trust in democracy. This level of distrust mirrors wider trends amongst the general population, as shown in figure 7. Trust in government ranks below trust in other institutions such as healthcare services or the police. On the other hand, trust in the news media does not fare much better, as also illustrated by data from the case studies: 33% of 18–34-year-olds in Ireland and 21.3% in Poland state they do not trust news media at all. 19.2% of those in Ireland and 38% in Poland moderately trust news media.

At the same time, Arrighi et al. (2022) found that trust in local/regional institutions in the EU is significantly higher than in national institutions, which is reflected in an average trust gap of 15 percentage points between the two. The trust gap is largest in France at 31.9 percentage points, with the Czech Republic, Lithuania and Slovenia also showing big differences. In contrast, Sweden, Italy, Croatia, and Ireland show the smallest difference, ranging from 4.6 to 5.6 percentage points. This means that even in these countries, local/ regional institutions are trusted more than national institutions.

4. Conclusions on youth and democracy policy study5

The FEPS study analysed the relationship between socioeconomically disadvantaged young people and politics and democracy in five countries: France, Hungary, Ireland, Poland and Spain. The study began by describing the socioeconomic conditions of these young people and the political contexts they face, taking a Europe-wide perspective in the introduction before looking at each country individually. With this approach, the study contextualised the extensive data collected in focus groups and expert interviews. This framework allowed to outline three key areas: (1) what young people value about democracy, (2) their concerns about its current state and (3) their hopes for its improvement.

The description of the economic context confirms previous research that generations of young people who reached adulthood in the aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis have experienced a process of precarisation to the extent that being young is increasingly correlated with being socioeconomically disadvantaged. Young people experiencing socioeconomic disadvantage across the five countries in this study can’t meet the cost of living because they are in low paid and precarious jobs. This is particularly acute in Spain where the harsh economic climate has left many of them overqualified and unemployed. Those living in rural areas, whether in France or Hungary, share the barriers of lack of transport, lack of employment and education opportunities, and lack of youth services. Participants in almost every focus group described shortages of affordable housing and accommodation. These translate into living with parents, overcrowding in some case studies, and delays in family formation. Unmet needs due to pressures on public health and community-based support services, and resultant untreated health issues, including mental health, were also reported across the case studies. The recommendations that follow at a national level may differ because they reflect the specificities of the country, for instance, Ireland’s use of citizen assemblies. However, the underlying themes are the same.

The study supports previous research finding that young people are increasingly dissatisfied with democracy and that this dissatisfaction reflects their overall assessment of the state of their country’s politics and economics. The research findings also suggest that this is not due to a strong tendency towards favouring authoritarianism over democracy as a system. While some recent surveys suggest worrying trends in this direction, this was less clear in the focus group discussions and expert interviews. Instead, participants supported democracy in principle, while also clear that the system they are living in is not “real democracy’”and “not democratic enough.” While the same slogans can also be used by populist forces to advocate an alternative model of democracy that is in fact a version of autocracy, in most cases this was not the spirit in which they were used in the focus groups.

In hybrid regimes, in the “grey zone” between democracies and autocracies, such as Hungary, most focus participants were keenly aware of the lack of democracy across their governing institutions, including the legal system. However, whether in Hungary or the more liberal democracy of France, they all felt distanced from traditional democratic processes. In other words, despite the differences between the case study countries in terms of democratic freedoms (e.g. civil society and press restrictions), young people from all the countries spoke of the inaccessibility, the distance and elitism of their political systems. These characteristics manifested themselves in excessive bureaucracy and the use of legalistic and opaque language, the absence of parliamentary, or government bodies dedicated specifically to youth, and the limited visibility or invisibility even of politicians in local areas. The issue of visibility was even more acute in rural areas.

In the research, government accountability and action were seen as crucial for restoring and reinforcing trust between young people and politicians and ensuring the stability and progress of democratic principles and institutions. While the young people involved in the research may not have been familiar with formal parliamentary politics, they were engaged with the politics of their local community and the wider regional, national and global issues impacting on it.

Due principally to their economic precarity, young people also described not having the time or energy to engage with politics in the traditional way in which their parents or grandparents might have done, such as becoming political party members. Political parties have lost their importance as a preferred space in which to construct significant social connections. Some young people talked about their fear of being stigmatised at work and their positions jeopardised if they were associated with a political party. They also pointed out that following politics online takes time, namely being able to moderate between polarising, and often negative messages.

Young people were unanimously opposed to the current political culture, which many associated with corruption, empty election promises, unreliable media and in some national contexts, a broken culture of debate, described by several French respondents as “like a zoo.” This shows that the aversion of some young French people to traditional politics has taken the form of an intensely felt disgust that indicates a deep dissatisfaction with the way politics is done. Conversely, they desired a free and open media to counter that culture. While this was raised in all countries, it was particularly pertinent in Hungary, where young people and experts spoke about the restrictions on media and attributed political differences, such as less liberal views on minorities, to young people’s reliance on state-owned stations and state-dominated private channels. This reliance was greater in rural than urban areas.

In sum, policymakers and politicians would be mistaken in thinking that young people’s disengagement with representative political systems in their current form and their disconnection with and lack of knowledge of formal /parliamentary politics can be equated with lack of interest in politics overall. Young people want their politicians and state institutions to communicate better with them and they want more of a say in the democratic and political decisions which will affect their lives. They have expressed their dissatisfaction with traditional forms of political communication via more protest-based, direct action, such as participation in climate action.

Political parties across the board must now acknowledge that they must find new ways of engaging young people across civil society, government and the political system. Firstly, to uphold the basic democratic principle that all voices are equally important, even if they are young or lack economic power, and secondly, to engage them in their political thinking as they go through the critical phase of forming political opinions that will often shape their beliefs for the rest of their lives. Young people must see themselves as represented and, as called for by participants in this study, possessing better administrative, political and civic opportunities for participation in rural and urban areas. In countries that are, facing or have faced until recently, autocratic leaning regimes, such as Hungary and Poland, NGOs can serve as important conduits for democratic norms.

The study has shown that young people know that their transition to adulthood is delayed due to adverse economic circumstances. They want policymakers to listen to them and respond to their economic and social needs. Hence, this section is a combination of two things. It merges the hopes of young people to improve democracy, as expressed in the focus groups, with their practical suggestions and recommendations put forward by the various experts interviewed for this study. The experts were often able to match young people’s concerns and ideas for change with specific and tangible proposals. As the study did not specifically focus on the European Union, FEPS conducted additional interviews with experts from EU institutions and conducted desk research to make some of these recommendations relevant to the supranational level.

The European Union may not have the legal authority to prescribe measures in some key areas that are important to address some of the main issues discussed. This is especially true for social policy and political education. However, this does not mean that the EU is not capable of doing anything. It can integrate a youth policy perspective into the areas where it has direct authority to prescribe measures, as well as in areas where it can only make recommendations and suggestions. Therefore, to address this, the European Union should:

1. Mainstream young people’s perspectives across all policymaking:
2. a) Establish a youth test to ensure that all new EU legislation and policy is subject to a youth focused impact assessment, including consultation with youth organisations at the EU level and the development of mitigation measures in case a negative impact is identified;
3. b) Expand the role of the EU Youth Coordinator to help her coordinate this work, ideally in cooperation with a commissioner focussing specifically on youth and future generations;
4. c) Expand the resources of the EU Youth Coordinator to improve the analytical toolbox used to identify the needs of young people with experience of socioeconomic disadvantage. This will help promote and protect their interests and advance their perspectives across government policy. Additionally, it will help promote equality, combat discrimination, and empower and enable their voices.

2. Improve young people’s participation in EU decision making:
3. d) Strengthen cooperation between EU umbrella youth organisations and young representatives of the EU political parties;
4. e) Remove barriers to young people standing as candidates. For example, by introducing quotas for young people on electoral lists, including placement in prominent positions, to be elected, similar to zipped lists used to ensure gender quotas;
5. f) Expand existing participatory and consultative mechanisms connecting EU institutions with young people and, most importantly, ensure outcomes are followed up and considered during EU decision making; and g) Support member states in collecting and analysing data on the use of services such as the EU’s online youth portal—which brings together all information on the EU’s work with young people—to determine whether the information it contains reaches young people with experience of socioeconomic disadvantage.

3. Build the capacity of young people with experience of socioeconomic disadvantage to participate in different political platforms:
4. a) Continue to monitor the need for financial support, e.g. in times of economic crises, to mitigate their long-term impact on the socioeconomic development of young people (e.g. by including youth-centred measures in short-term employment programmes such as SURE, which was used during Covid-19);
5. b) Further improve existing flagship programmes such as the reinforced Youth Guarantee by improving the quality of education and employment opportunities offered under this guarantee, to guide member states in introducing data collection and reporting systems to enable policy evaluation that identifies necessary improvements, and to encourage member states to implement changes to the Youth Guarantee;
6. c) Create employment opportunities that enable young people from disadvantaged backgrounds to gain quality work experience within the EU and political institutions;
7. d) Expand and support programmes that provide educational opportunities, especially those that focus on civic education and those that help young people experience democracy in action (including the inclusion of approaches to debate deliberation in youth programmes on various topics);
8. e) Promote and increase the resources to expand EU youth programmes, particularly those for disadvantaged people (such as ALMA) and develop engagement and build on existing inclusion strategies to ensure broad and intersectional participation, especially of ethnic minorities.

4. Support member states to build participatory and democratic mechanisms and provide inclusive and democratic spaces in cooperation with young people, for example, through existing practices of inclusion and diversity assessments of European Union programming related to youth and focusing funding schemes on people with fewer opportunities.

5. As recommended in the Charter on Youth and Democracy, increase awareness and strengthen protections on social media against:
6. a) Civil and youth organisations from being labelled political, especially when they are critical of the government;
7. b) Misinformation; and
8. c) Polarising and discriminatory behaviour.

6. Support member states in funding research on youth policies, collecting gender and age disaggregated data and ensuring the transparency and accessibility of that data.

1 Foundation for European Progressive Studies, 2024, About FEPS, https://feps-europe.eu/about/

2 Foundation for European Progressive Studies, 2023, Activity Report 2022, https://feps-europe.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/Activity-Report-2022.pdf

3 Foundation for European Progressive Studies, 2024, How young people facing disadvantage view democracy in Europe, https://feps-europe.eu/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/How-Young-People-Facing-Disadvantage-View-Democracy-in-Europe.pdf

4 Foundation for European Progressive Studies, 2024, How young people facing disadvantage view democracy in Europe, https://feps-europe.eu/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/How-Young-People-Facing-Disadvantage-View-Democracy-in-Europe.pdf

5 Foundation for European Progressive Studies, 2024, How young people facing disadvantage view democracy in Europe, https://feps-europe.eu/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/How-Young-People-Facing-Disadvantage-View-Democracy-in-Europe.pdf